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The discussions on regional integration have largely focused on the formal structures 
and institutions making the East African Community. Yet, very little attention has been 
paid to the democratization of the Community. Integration schemes aim at widening 
markets for member states, pooling of resources together and enjoying regional 
economies of scale. There are also a large and growing number of regional 
organizations that promote free trade and other forms of economic interchange. Some, 
are little more than shell organizations that barely keep their goals alive. However the 
very existence of each regional organization is a manifestation of its membership belief 
that going it alone would not be as advantageous as working together in the interest of 
greater economic prosperity.  
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Introduction 
The East African Community (EAC) is a 
regional intergovernmental organization 
established under Article 2 of the Treaty 
for the Establishment of the East African 
Community that came into force on 7th 
July, 2002. The treaty emphasized that it 
was establishing the East African 
Community comprising a common market. 
It was eventually to merge into a Monetary 
Union and finally a Political Federation. 
From the treaty, it was economics first, a 
monetary union, a common market second 
and eventually a Political Federation. 
 
The membership of the Community 
included; the republics of Rwanda, 
Burundi, Kenya, Uganda and the United 
Republic of Tanzania. In its operations, the 
Community as stated in paragraph 1 
Article 5, that the merger would strengthen 
and regulate the industrial, commercial, 
infrastructural, cultural, social and political 
relations. This is intended to accelerate 
harmonious, balanced development and 
sustained expansion of economic 
activities. 
 
The Community operationalises the treaty 
incrementally. The first Development 
Strategy covered the period 1997-2000 and 
was basically about re-launching the EAC. 
The second Development Strategy was 
from 2001-2005 and covered the 
establishment of the EAC Customs Union. 
The third Development Strategy 2006-
2010 focused on the establishment of 
Common Market and the fourth 
Development Strategy from July 2011 to 
June 2016 mainly aims at the 
implementation of the EAC Common 
Market and the creation of EAC Monetary 
Union. The fourth Development Strategy 
2011-2016 emphasizes the consolidation 
of gains from the Customs Union, 
functioning Common Market and putting a 
firm foundation for the next stages of the 
integration process. Also taken into 
cognizance was the full inclusion of the 
Burundi and Rwanda as members of the 
EAC. 
Other critical aspects of the fourth 
Development Strategy include; 
• Guidelines of cooperation between 
EAC and other blocks like EU, USA 
• Developing frameworks for relating 
with emerging economies like China, 
India, Brazil among others 
• Participating in AU integration and 
governance frameworks 
• Institutionalization of functions 
• EAC, COMESA and SADC tripartite 
arrangements 
• The socio-economic, political and 
environmental situation within the 
African region 
• Finally, harmonization of common 
trade policies within the EAC 
 
The EAC reiterated adherence to 
universally acceptable principles in 
democracy, the rule of law, observance of 
human rights and social justice as pre-
conditions for admission of new members. 
The Community declared its objective in 
Articles 2 and 4 as, ‘the development of 
policies and programmes aimed at 
widening and deepening cooperation 
among partner states in various fields such 
as political, economic, social, cultural, 
defence, security, legal and judicial affairs 
for their collective gains. 
 
The operating principles were based on 
mutual trust, political goodwill, equitable 
distribution of benefits, and peaceful 
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settlement of disputes, peaceful co-
existence and good neighborliness. The 
Community was to be people-centered and 
market driven. This implies that the 
Community adopted a neo-liberal agenda 
of the Washington Consensus whereby 
people centered cooperation was organized 
around the institution of the market. 
 
The Community also borrowed the 
principle of subsidiarity from the European 
Union, which emphasizes on multi-level 
participation and inclusion of diverse 
stakeholders in the integration process. 
The idea of complimentarity among the 
partners was also asserted. The treaty 
provided for the following institutions: 
i. The Summit of Heads of States 
ii. The Council of Ministers 
iii. The Coordinating Committee of 
Permanent Secretaries responsible 
for East African Cooperation in the 
Partner States 
iv. Sectoral Committees 
v. The East African Community 
Court 
vi. The East African Community 
Assembly drawn from the National 
Assemblies 
vii. The Secretariat 
 
The Community was anchored in 
collaboration within a liberalized trade 
economy and development was to be 
realized through a Common Market and 
Customs Union as an integral part of the 
integration journey. Measures aimed at 
addressing imbalances arising from the 
Common Market and Customs Union is 
found in Article 83 of the treaty. 
 
The Development Strategy 2006-2010 was 
intended to form a foundation for the 
political federation. A number of issues to 
be considered in the process towards 
political federation included; enhancing 
good governance, democratization, peace, 
security and good neighborliness; 
promoting closer relationships with 
regional and international organizations, 
creating critical regional institutions like 
Parliament, Court among others. Equally 
the strategy envisaged timely and reliable 
early warning system mechanisms and 
conflict mitigation. 
 
Towards this end, the EAC forum of 
Electoral Commissions has provided a 
platform of comparing experiences and 
challenges in managing democratic, free 
and fair elections in the region; emphasis 
on the protection of human rights in the 
region through National Human Rights 
Commissions forum; EAC annual 
conference on good governance, inter 
agency cooperation and partnerships in the 
region.   
 
Until recently, discussions of the East 
African regional integration process have 
largely focused on the formal structures 
and institutions of the new EAC (later 
referred to as Community). Yet, very little 
attention has been accorded to the 
democratization of the Community. To 
what extent have civil society groups been 
active in pushing for the democratization 
of the Community? According to Kiondo, 
(2002:19) although Chapter 28 of the 
Treaty establishing the East African 
Community mentions civil society 
alongside the private sector as the 
Community’s key pillars, more focus is 
placed on the private sector than civil 
society. “In fact, the Treaty has no clear 
understanding of the concept of civil 
society.” Yet the same Treaty identifies the 
main reasons for the collapse of the 
DBA Africa Management Review 
2012, Vol 3 No 1 pp. 100-114 
103 |  
 
erstwhile EAC in 1977 as, inter alia, the 
lack of strong participation of civil society 
in the Community’s activities. Nabudere, 
(2004:8) argues that the constitutional 
arrangements currently being fast tracked 
in the EAC Heads of States are not pro-
poor. He contends that to date “no 
comprehensive plan has so far emerged to 
involve political parties of the region into 
the integration process”. Kamanyi, 
(2006:23) argues that constitutional 
development in East Africa is hampered 
by the differential democratic traditions of 
the member states. 
 
This paper compares and contrasts the 
democratic experience so far between the 
EU and the EAC. While the paper is based 
on the widely held assumption that the 
EAC is based on the EU model, it 
recognizes that the two regional blocs only 
share similarities in structures and 
institutions (Baregu 2010:16). This 
information is potentially useful for EAC 
policy makers interested in borrowing best 
practices from the EU and civil society 
actors keen on advancing the 
democratization of the EAC. The 
information may also be useful to scholars 
undertaking research on the prospects and 
challenges of the EAC process. This 
information is particularly useful in light 
of the regions myriad problems faced by 
globalization threats which make the 
integration process a matter of necessity. 
The article is motivated by the conviction 
that regional integration is a matter driven 
by the imperatives of global threats. The 
question is thus not whether, but how 
integration may be accelerated. In the 
balance of this paper, section two will 
provide a brief conceptualization of civil 
society and democratization. Section three 
discusses the EU democratic experience. 
Section four discusses the EAC 
democratization process. The last section 
is a conclusion.  
 
Civil Society and Democratization 
Since the introduction of the civil society 
discourse in the context of the 1980s crisis 
of the state in Africa, disagreement still 
exists on the concept. Many academic 
contributors tend to argue that civil society 
is an ideologically-loaded concept. 
Traditional conceptions of civil society 
define it as all those institutions that play 
out in the political space between the 
family and the state. On the contrary, 
conventional definitions favoured by 
institutions of global governance embrace 
de Tocqueville’s definition of civil society 
as encompassing civil and political 
associations organized in a competitive 
market place. Such associations include 
but are not limited to social clubs, 
churches, political parties, NGOs, private 
businesses and trade unions (Kisinga 
2009:27).  
On the other hand, democracy is also 
contested analytically and ideologically 
(Wiseman, 1996:26). Similarly, Joseph, 
(1989:21) contends that traditional 
approaches to democratization have been 
ethnocentric and thus are unable to 
illuminate political processes in Africa. 
Dahl’s (1986:32) minimalist concept of 
democracy characterizes a democratic 
polity as featured by elected officials, free 
and fair elections, inclusive suffrage and 
the right to run for office. Furthermore, a 
democracy enjoys freedom of expression, 
alternative information, and assembly or 
associational rights, which are supported 
or protected by the government. Moreover, 
“the existence of such pillars of democracy 
in society presupposes the respect for basic 
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human right and the strict observance of 
the due process of the law [and] 
participation in the governance of society. 
Schmitter (2005:35) argues that a 
democracy is based on three dimensions: 
citizenship, representation, and decision 
making. Thus democratization essentially 
entails transitions from authoritarian to 
liberal democratic systems. 
 
According to Kibara (2005:19) three 
categories/dimensions of democracy may 
be useful in measuring the extent of 
democratization: structural, functional and 
concrete indicators. The structural 
indicators refer to inequalities of fact or 
law (Gitonga, 1987 cited in Kibara, 
2005:10). Functional indicators are defined 
as the amount of freedom of expression 
and the variety of alternatives that people 
can choose from when making decisions. 
The ability of people to hire and fire their 
agents, whether elected representatives are 
able to exercise effective control over their 
own subordinates, especially executive 
agents, public bureaucracy, and 
representation by the peoples agents are 
referred to as concrete indicators. 
 
The European Union  
Rhinard (2002:13) investigated the 
operations and democratic legitimacy of 
the EU committee system. He found that 
they are increasingly coming under attack 
for their lack of democratic credentials. 
This lack of democratic legitimacy is 
attributed to the poor balance struck 
between system effectiveness and 
democracy. Yet Moravcsik et al. (2000) 
disagrees with such arguments regarding 
the EU. He observes that there is little 
evidence that the EU suffers from a 
democratic deficit. According to him, 
therefore, judged by existing nation-states’ 
practices and in the context of the 
multilayered EU system, rather than an 
ideal plebiscitary or parliamentary 
democracy, the EU enjoys support across 
the member states’ publics. According to 
Eriksen and Fossum (2002:18), ‘strong 
publics’ (European Parliament, the 
committee system, Charter convention) – 
defined as institutionalized bodies of 
deliberation and decision-making – vary in 
their status and performance as strong 
publics yet they all inject the logic of 
impartial justification in to the EU system. 
 
Yet other scholars like Schmitter (2003) 
disagree with such sanguine assessments 
of the EU’s democratic performance. He 
states that the democratization project of 
the EU is still remote. To him, the EU is 
akin to a consociational democracy for 
four reasons.  
 
 Small states are still overrepresented in 
the voting formula of its council of 
ministers  
 In the distribution of seats in 
Parliament and  
 In the assignment of high officials in 
its Commission 
 Lastly, unanimity is still a requirement 
on a wide range of important issues 
(Schmitter 2003:71).  
Furthermore, the absence of statutory 
guarantees specifying the powers 
attributed to supranational, national or sub-
national governments has meant that not 
even a quasi federal consensus on the 
distribution of those powers has been 
achieved.  Instead, only the principle of 
subsidiarity has been accepted as 
enshrined in the Amsterdam Treaty in 
which functional tasks are devolved to the 
lowest feasible level of aggregation. The 
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EU, according to proponents of this view 
is not a federation/confederation/state, but 
a system of multilayered and polycentric 
governance. Such a system is 
characterized by three key properties: 
 
 A governance mechanism exists for 
dealing with a broad range of problems 
in which actors arrive at mutually 
satisfactory and binding decisions by 
negotiation and deliberation; 
 
 A multilayered arrangement exists for 
making binding decisions involving 
politically independent and but 
interdependent actors – private and 
public - at different levels of territorial 
aggregation but doesn’t assign 
exclusive policy competence to any 
level; and  
 
 Polycentric delegation of authority 
over functional tasks to a set of 
dispersed and relatively autonomous 
agencies. 
Hence any effort to democratize the EU 
must take into account the peculiarities of 
the emerging governance structures. 
 
Yet disinterest from the public and the 
press implies there is not yet a European 
active population of democrats concerned 
with its supranational governance. 
Furthermore, the Convention 
disproportionately involved partisan 
European and national parliamentarians at 
the expense of interest group 
representatives, national civil servants, and 
the Commission’s functionaries who 
earlier dominated EU policy making. The 
normal practice by earlier national 
governments was to enhance the visibility 
of their own delegates drawn from the 
executive – at the level of Ministers – in 
order to diminish the importance of Civil 
Society representatives. Perhaps this 
asserts the inter-governmental nature of 
the integration process.  
Hence concerns about the EU’s democratic 
deficit led the 15 member states to 
convene a convention on the future of 
Europe. The convention was charged with 
redesigning the institutions and decision 
rules of the EU (2001) - its mandate set in 
the Laeken declaration chaired by Valery 
Giscard d’Estaing. In 2003, they approved 
a consensual draft of a constitutional treaty 
to be considered by an intergovernmental 
conference (IGC) for revision and 
approval. According to Schmitter, this is 
evidence of the existence of overlapping 
consensus on certain basic norms and 
institutions of contemporary democracy, 
especially the myriad of civil society 
groups that participated. The convention 
was meant to deal with three issues: 
 The anticipated decline in 
effectiveness of EU policy making 
due to the impending Eastern 
enlargement; 
 
 The gradual decline in relative 
voting strength of large states due 
to overrepresentation of past and 
future small states;  
 
 The decline in EU legitimacy 
among European publics due to 
excessively complex, remote and 
technocratic decision making rules. 
 
Because the Convention dealt more 
effectively with the first two, it can be 
concluded it did not contribute much to the 
democratization of the EU. The EU has 
only thus entered into its “political 
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adolescence, the beginning rather than the 
end of its democratic evolution. 
Additionally, the EU project of federation 
is unlikely for the following reasons: 
 Constitutionalization: the EU does 
not yet have a singular set of 
overarching rules but a set of 
treaties - considered by the public 
as inviolable except through formal 
and elaborate amendment 
procedures;  
 Multilateralism: arrangements for 
making binding decisions involve 
politically independent but 
interdependent actors private and 
public at different levels of 
territorial aggregation but doesn’t 
assign exclusive policy competence 
to any level; 
 Polycentricism: the EU delegates 
authority over functional tasks to a 
set of dispersed and relatively 
autonomous agencies. 
 
In addition, the above mentioned 
Convention highlighted the cleavages 
within the EU between member states of 
different orientation. These states 
correspond to real interest cleavages – 
countries with different levels of 
development, differential commitment to 
social welfare, government composition 
(left/right), balance between agricultural 
producers and consumers.  In addition, 
with enlargement, threats exist to the 
French–German alliance and even control 
by the six founding members over their 
historical role in the creation of the EEC. 
 
The widely held view is that the EU can 
fully democratize and eventually evolve 
into a federal system. To the extent that 
this is possible, it can come about through 
incremental changes. Schmitter (2000:71) 
attributed the EU’s democratic deficit to 
lack of political will and functional need to 
democratize the EU. His discussion is 
embedded in the extension of new 
functionalism to the political context. 
According to this theory cooperation in 
functional tasks in one area will create 
pressures for cooperation in new tasks 
through spillover effects. In the event such 
spillovers occur, key institutions of 
democracy will have to be reinvented to 
take account of the three pillars around 
which a democracy revolves i.e. 
citizenship, representation and decision 
making procedures. Indeed, he assesses the 
EU along these dimensions. The key issue 
that remains is how the funding of the 
regional bloc will continue to be met in 
face one of the potential strain that 
enlargement by incorporating Eastern 
European countries is likely to bring to 
existing institutions and therefore, widen 
the democratic deficit. 
 
Saurugger (2007:10) further contend that 
attempts to democratize the EU are likely 
to come up against divergent democratic 
traditions in a number of member states. 
Focusing on the comparison of the 
democratic traditions in France and the EU 
at the level of constitutional and 
institutional arrangements that influence 
inclusion of civil society participation in 
decision making structures, she concludes 
that in both France and the EU, 
participatory mechanism are mere 
extensions of existing practices, and are 
still undergirded by an elitist and 
functional tradition. Thus, in both cases, 
there is a tendency towards convergence in 
practices, although at first sight France’s 
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statist’s tradition is at odds with the 
emergent pluralist system of the EU.  
 The EU project of democratization is still 
remote. It is in fact a form of 
consociational democracy. Small states are 
still overrepresented in the (1) voting 
formula of its Council of Ministers (2) 
distribution of seats in its parliament and 
(3) the assignment of high officials in its 
commission. (4) Unanimity is still required 
among member states on a wide range of 
important issues. 
 
The absence of statutory guarantees 
specifying the powers attributed to 
supranational, national or sub-national 
governments has meant that not even a 
quasi-federal consensus on the distribution 
of these powers has been achieved. What 
has been achieved is only acceptance of 
the principle of subsidiary enshrined in the 
treaty of Amsterdam. The Treaty stipulates 
that tasks are devolved to the lowest 
feasible level of political organization. 
 
The East African Community 
The Treaty establishing the EAC mentions 
key institutions that will further the cause 
of political cooperation. These are the 
Summit, the Council, the Coordination 
Committee, Sectoral committees, the EAC 
court, the EA legislative assembly, and the 
Secretariat. Similarly, in the EAC 
development strategy (1997 - 2000), levels 
at which political cooperation would be 
realized are identified as: Heads of State 
Summit, Ministries responsible for foreign 
affairs, ambassadors and high 
commissioners, provincial/district 
authorities and national parliaments (EAC 
Treaty Ch. 3, Article. 9 (1)).  
The objectives of the EAC are to: 
 to develop policies and programmes 
aimed at widening and deepening co-
operation among the Partner States in 
political, economic, social and cultural 
fields, research and technology, 
defence, security and legal and judicial 
affairs, for their mutual benefit;  
 to establish among themselves and in 
accordance with the provisions of this 
Treaty, a Customs Union, a Common 
Market , subsequently a Monetary 
Union and ultimately a Political 
Federation in order to strengthen and 
regulate the industrial, commercial, 
infrastructural, cultural, social, 
political and other relations of the 
Partner States; and  
 to sustainable growth and development 
of the Partner States by the promotion 
of a more balanced and harmonious 
development, co-operation in agreed 
fields, sustainable utilization of the 
natural resources, consolidation of the 
long standing ties and associations 
between the EAC peoples, 
mainstreaming of gender in all its 
endeavours, peace and security and 
private sector and civil society 
partnerships (Article 5, EAC Treaty). 
 
Yet, according to Baregu (2010:12) the 
objectives outlined in the Treaty are in no 
way innovative except for the goals of 
establishing a political federation, the 
objective are contradictory to those of the 
larger African Economic Community and 
the African Union and, lastly, there is no 
provision of a time-scale against which 
progress may be evaluated.  
 
The following discussion will attempt to 
assess the extent to which this institutional 
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framework has facilitated democratization 
of the Community’s affairs. Several 
comments can be made on the possibility 
of democratizing the Community. The first 
concerns the centralization of powers 
around the institution of the Summit. 
Notable is that the Summit is made up of 
the Heads of State of the member states. In 
essence the powers accorded the 
Presidents seems to imply that they hold 
veto powers over any decision they may 
object to. The decisions in question may 
include, for example, those perceived to go 
against national interests. Thus Chapter 
Four Article 10(8) states that any member 
of the Summit may record his objection to 
a proposal submitted for the decision of 
the Summit and, if any such objection is 
recorded, the Summit shall not proceed 
with the proposal unless the objection is 
withdrawn. Yet according to Mohabe 
Nyirabu (1998:6) a simple majority rule 
would be more useful unless the issue 
concerned involved extreme national 
survival. 
 
Indeed, the significance of the powers 
given to the Summit is much more 
meaningful if it is considered that 
members of the East African Legislative 
Assembly are appointees of the respective 
national parliaments rather than directly 
elected by the wider East African 
electorate. Yet, the importance of 
grounding ownership of the community’s 
processes within the population of East 
Africa, and bestowing a sense of 
legitimacy to the Assembly’s decisions 
seems to have been neglected. The 
Assembly is one critical link between the 
community and the population. The 
Summit is relegated to procedural issues 
(Kiondo, 2006:19). Furthermore, he argues 
that because the Assembly’s members do 
not reflect the makeup of the East African 
population, let alone the small number of 
the representatives, 
 
“they will not have a constituency 
in the wider population to whom 
they will feel obliged to  report 
back to, and to reflect their views 
in the Assembly. Also, since their 
election is a caucus process, it will 
not involve wide ranging 
campaigns that will educate arid 
even excite people on the 
Community (Kiondo 2006:19). 
 
His conclusion is that trading off cost 
factors for democratic legitimacy is 
unhelpful in the long term. The Wako 
committee on Fast-Tracking the EAC 
integration in fact suggested that in the 
envisaged political federation, the Federal 
Parliament should be elected along the 
lines of the method used in electing the 
current East African Legislative Assembly 
or as may be recommended by the 
Constitutional Commission. It also 
suggested that from 2010 to 2012 the 
Electoral Commission and other 
institutions provided for under the Federal 
Constitution should be put in place. 
Federal Constituencies should also be 
delineated and between January and March 
2013, elections for the President and the 
Federal Parliament should be held 
(Kamanyi, 2009). 
 
While such suggestions are welcome, the 
possibility that acrimony between the 
Heads of States, which precipitated the 
collapse of the EAC in 1977 may yet occur 
again if the legislative assembly is not 
strengthened to step in the event of 
ideological and other disputes between the 
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Summit members. This is because as 
currently constituted the Assembly lacks a 
popular base from which it can claim to 
represent the wishes and aspirations of the 
larger East African electorate and the 
absence of its constitution by political 
parties standing for various ideological 
and/or policy platforms. These ideological 
and/or policy differences are a sine qua 
non for the pluralization of the 
Community’s processes and hence the 
legitimation of its institutions.   
 
Other concerns and worries over the 
different democratic traditions of the 
political systems in the three founding East 
African countries. While Kenya and 
Tanzania have multiparty political 
systems, Uganda runs a movement 
political system. Yet, the Treaty explicitly 
acknowledges among the fundamental 
principles guiding its workings as “good 
governance including adherence to the 
principles of democracy, the rule of law, 
accountability, transparency, social justice, 
equal opportunities, gender equality, as 
well as the recognition, promotion and 
protection of human and people’s rights in 
accordance with the provisions of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (Article 6 (d).” 
 
For example, the constitutional making 
process continues to be at the center of the 
democratization process in Kenya. In 
August, 2010, Kenyans successfully voted 
for a new constitution in a referendum 
widely hailed as free and fair. Despite the 
threats to implementation by the elements 
of the old order, progress on key 
constitutional bills is remarkable. In 
Tanzania, the hegemony  of Chama Cha 
Mapinduzi (CCM) as a political party both 
on Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar, was 
in the last elections challenged in 
presidential elections with accusations 
from Opposition candidates of government 
sanctioned rigging. Indeed, in Dar es 
Salaam and Arusha, street protests 
occurred that clearly evidenced the 
awakening for the fight for democracy. 
Tensions with Zanzibar on the other hand 
continue to remain a thorn in the flesh for 
the ruling party over claims by the latter 
for independence. In Uganda, the 
stranglehold of NRM and its dislike for 
opposition has meant that elections are 
clearly a farce. 
Government structures within the member 
states are also at odds. For example the 
national parliaments have differing sizes. 
Whereas the Ugandan has 375 members of 
Parliament, the largest in the nation's 
history, and the biggest in the East African 
region, Kenya has 216 MPs, Rwanda 105, 
Burundi 155 including senators, and 
Tanzania, 356. According to estimates, on 
average, one MP represents about 70,000 
people in Uganda, 130,000 people in 
Tanzania, and 185,000 in Kenya. Yet, 
given resource scarcities in the region, 
some commentators have argued that the 
constitutional roles of the legislature: 
representation, legislation and oversight 
can be performed effectively with small 
numbers of MPs. Ndebesa of Makerere 
University argues that parliament is 
exploited by the President to secure regime 
legitimization and expansion of the 
patronage network. And "As a result, 
parliament has undermined democracy 
instead of promoting it and thereby 
hindered development." 
The problem of the delays in remittances 
to the Secretariat by member states is also 
crucial in fast-tracking the integration 
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processes. Yet, according to Richard 
Sindinga, the director of Economic 
Affairs, Ministry of East African 
Community, “Delays in member states 
remitting their contributions is mainly due 
to the fact that the EAC contributions are 
not prioritized by member states.” In the 
last fiscal budget, partner states pledged 
$30,748,369 but failed to fulfill their quota 
remittances hence a supplementary budget 
was presented for approval — an 
additional $18.7 million for projects and 
another $1.7 million for activities of the 
East African Legislative Assembly. The 
director also mentions the differences in 
exchange rates among member countries. 
According to him, the Kenyan shilling has 
lost value to the dollar within a short 
period which means the value of the 
country’s contribution to EAC has altered 
(East African, 5 June 2011).  
Thus there will be a deficit both on the 
side of the contributing country and the 
overall budget, which interferes with 
planning according to Sindiga. “Steps are 
underway to implement a new mode of 
payment — pegged on individual 
country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
Yet the policy implication of this latter 
move may be that the country with the 
largest GDP in the region, and therefore 
the economic disparities in the region, will 
influence the nature of policies of the 
region. This latter prospect may yet 
rekindle the historical differences s over 
the role of the state in the economies of 
the region (East African, 5 June 2011).  
The compositions of national parliaments 
in the region are also a critical factor in 
facilitating rapid decisions concerning the 
evolution of the EAC. The Kenyan 
Parliament has had the most active 
experience with an organized opposition. 
Since the first multi-party elections in 
1992, the ruling party KANU was 
basically a minority government elected by 
less that 40 per cent of the popular vote. 
By contrast the Kibaki regime came to 
power with over 60 per cent of the vote 
establishing a strong for mandate policy 
formulation and implementation. Yet 
recent contested elections in 2007 and the 
ensuing violence have pointed to the 
fragility of Kenya’s political institutions. 
In Tanzania, the legislature has continued 
to enjoy the solid presence of CCM 
members of parliament albeit the fact that 
is has recently been experiencing loss of 
support in some parts of the country. Yet it 
can be argued that the Tanzanian 
Parliament currently enjoys a high level of 
political consensus as demonstrated by the 
overwhelming acceptance. In Uganda the 
movement system of government provides 
little room for organized opposition to 
government policies. This has tended to 
restrict the range of policies formulated 
especially due to the government’s 
antipathy towards opposition.  
 
The EAC Treaty also recognizes a 
"people-centered approach" to 
consolidation the regional integration 
process. Indeed, Article 4 Section 3(d) 
states that one of its objectives includes 
"strengthening and consolidation of 
associations between the people of the 
Partner States so as to promote-a people-
centered mutual development. ‘Yet, in 
practice, the Treaty leaves little room for 
the operationalization of people-oriented 
approaches. The top down nature of 
decision-making and the lack of public 
consultation in the Summit could 
potentially alienate the populations of East 
African from internalizing the integration 
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process precisely because of the tendency 
to portray the integration process as an 
intergovernmental activity rather than a 
popular process.  
More critically is the fact that civil society 
participation has almost been non-existent. 
In chapter 28 where the civil society is 
mentioned alongside the private sector 
institutions and mechanism would be 
established to strengthen the EAC-public 
links in order to canvass as widely as 
possible the views of most East Africans. 
Instead, as alluded to earlier, the chapter is 
much more focused on the private sector - 
through the East African Business Council 
- than the civil society. In fact the Treaty 
has no clear understanding of the concept 
of civil society. “Rather, it seems to be 
market-oriented, pro-government and 
personality driven (Kiondo, 2006:9).” 
Indeed, while The East African Business 
Council is to be accorded observer status 
in the meetings of the Commission and its 
subsidiary organs, civil society groups 
have not been equally treated when it 
comes to consultation over public policy 
issues.  
 
There exist attempts to incorporate women 
and youth groups but the process has been 
slow to recognize the importance of the 
critical inputs of civil society, although a 
draft mobilization strategy for civil society 
(March, 2010) to ensure sustainable and 
equitable development has been 
developed. The draft defines civil society 
as “A realm of organized social life that is 
voluntary, self generating, self-supporting, 
autonomous from the state, and bound by a 
legal set of shared rules.” This was 
however modified in workshop of EAC 
civil society experts as ‘A realm of 
organized social life that is voluntary, self-
generating, and autonomous from the state, 
and bound by a set of shared values for the 
common good of the people.’ Before this 
initiative no mechanism existed to 
integrate the roles of civil society in to the 
Community’s functions.  
It is however unclear how the 
operationalization of the mobilization 
strategy will impact on civil society 
participation. To date, only CSOs that 
transcend national boundaries can qualify 
for observer status. Such organizations 
include the Kituo Cha Katiba, and the EA 
Business Council. Applications for the 
same have been made by the EA Youth 
Council, the EA Magistrates and Judges 
Association and International Council for 
Social Welfare EA Trade Union Council. 
To be sure, one notable improvement on 
the East African Community arrangement 
is the role given to the private sector. The 
role of the private sector in the 
development of the single market and 
investment area is based on the neo-liberal 
logic of the integration process in which 
intraregional trade expansion is driven by 
private capital while the role of the state is 
relegated to the maintenance of law and 
order and the guarantee of contracts. A 
regional apex body for women 
organizations is to be formed to champion 
women's issues, which are seen as 
important. Finally, regional based 
organizations will also be encouraged for 
youth and professional organizations in 
order to mobilize civil society in support 
of enhanced cooperation. Yet even if these 
bodies are formed at regional level, it is 
not clearly spelt out how they will be 
involved in policy making. There is also 
no mechanism to cause the formation of 
these organizations at a regional level. 
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Finally, the existence of a variety of 
conflicts in the EAC may derail the peace 
and unity that is necessary to consolidate 
democratic structures. Hence the Partner 
States are currently in the process of 
harmonizing their policies in order to 
"establish common foreign and security 
policies" (Article 131 Section 1). Yet 
security policies are highly controversial. 
This becomes much more important given 
the continued cooperation with members 
states with the USA on the war on terror in 
the region especially given that the region 
has experienced such terrorist attacks 
before. Other than Tanzania, all the other 
countries in the EAC are experiencing 
major conflicts (directly or indirectly) that 
pose a violent threat to many of their 
citizens. If the current efforts to establish 
region wide Standby Forces (e.g. 
EASBRIG)  are fully implemented then, 
the recent expansion of the East African 
Community to include Rwanda and 
Burundi is one avenue that has opened up 
for enhancing regional security 
governance. 
 
 
Intervention Strategies and Conclusion 
It is important to quickly develop systems 
that will allow for open popular elections 
of EALA by the people. This has the 
potential of enhancing popular awareness 
and participation among the East Africans. 
It is quite critical to develop closer 
working relationship with between EALA 
and national parliaments to facilitate 
consolidation of gains and encourage 
complimentarity in the realization of a 
more inclusive and people based decision 
making process. Other intervention 
measures would broadly include: 
 
i. Development of necessary 
guidelines and structural 
mechanisms for the attainment of 
political federation 
ii. Harmonization of best practices in 
institutionalization and capacity 
building in promoting participatory 
governance, rule of law and 
protection of people’s rights 
iii. Encouraging programmes that truly 
nurture East African identity, unity 
and collaboration 
iv. Streamline and strengthen the 
mandates and capacities of regional 
organs for efficiency 
v. Create a common platform in 
conceptualizing development and 
democratic processes by ensuring 
the inalienable right of individuals 
to participate by means of free, 
credible and democratic procedures 
vi. Involve and take advantage of the 
huge reservoir of diaspora by 
providing a conducive social, 
economic and political 
environment that will tap into their 
expertise in building the regional 
economies 
vii. Encouraging partnership in fighting 
terrorism and intelligence sharing 
in containing crime 
viii. Institutionalization of wider and 
inclusive stakeholder participation 
ix. Developing a regional media house 
that would report, educate, 
highlight opportunities and create 
clearer awareness among the 
people 
x. Conscious of the fact that the 
scourge of conflicts in the region 
constitutes a major impediment to 
the socio-economic development of 
the region and of the need to 
promote peace, security and 
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stability as a prerequisite for the 
implementation of the regional 
development and democratic 
agenda 
xi. Facilitate the development of 
vibrant civil society organizations 
at the national, sub-regional and 
regional levels  
 
This paper has demonstrated that both the 
EU and EAC model of democratization 
continue to suffer from democratic 
deficits. While the EU has evolved a 
multilayered and polycentric institutions, 
reflecting a modest agreement on 
democratic norms and institutions, the 
EAC is still plagued by the individual 
authoritarian pasts of the member states. 
Hence centralization of powers around the 
institution of the Summit, nomination of 
EALA members by national parliaments, 
different democratic traditions of the 
political systems, bloated government 
structures, non-remittance of member state 
fees, composition of national parliaments, 
lack of popular participation and 
internecine conflicts continues to 
undermine the democratization of the 
EAC.  Although civil society is 
increasingly being recognized in the 
process, very little attention has been 
accorded to its role in the integration 
process. Hence in contrast to the EU, the 
EAC is still largely driven by the interests 
of the regions Heads of states. This 
therefore becomes a major challenge to the 
democratization of the Community and 
adequate space for the Civil Society. 
 
The Community is thus faced with the 
uphill task of maintaining political 
cooperation among the Heads of partner 
states and establishing a culture and an 
environment for adoption and ratification 
of regional policies. Democratization of 
the region is also affected by inadequate 
capacity, weak institutions and lack of 
consensus on the EAC constitution. It is 
important for the region to embrace non-
adversarial political competition and 
develop inclusive political systems. 
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